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Abstract—Opacity is a security property formalizing the
information leakage of a system to an external observer, namely
intruder. The conventional opacity that has been studied in
the Discrete Event System (DES) literature usually assumes
passive intruders, who only observe the behavior of the system.
However, in many cybersecurity concerns, such as web service,
active intruders, who are capable of influencing the system’s
behavior beyond passive observations, need to be considered
and defended against. We are therefore motivated to extend
the opacity notions to handle active intruders. For this, we
model the system as a non-deterministic finite-state transducer.
It is assumed that the intruder has a full knowledge of the
system structure and is capable of interacting with the system
by injecting different inputs and observing its responses. In this
setup, we first introduce reactive current-state opacity (RCSO)
notion characterizing a property that the system does not leak
its secret state regardless of how the intruder manipulates
the system behavior. We furthermore extend this notion to
language-based and initial-state reactive opacity notions, and
study the relationship among them. It turns out that all the
proposed reactive opacity notions are equivalent to RCSO. We
therefore focus on RCSO and study its verification problem.
It is shown that the RCSO can be verified by constructing
an observer automaton. Illustrative examples are provided
throughout the paper to demonstrate the key definition and
the effectiveness of the proposed opacity verification approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cybersecurity is increasingly becoming a great concern
as networks of embedded-systems and computers are inte-
grated into almost all aspects of our daily life and society.
Exchanging confidential information over these networks is
crucial in many applications, ranging from smart phones and
home automation to banking services. This raises a serious
concern on the vulnerability of these systems.
Many efforts have been made to develop reliable and
secure systems that led to various notions of security/privacy.
One class of security/privacy notations is related to Informa-
tion flow from the system to an external observer [1]. Opacity
is a type of information-flow property that characterizes
whether the system’s secret information can be inferred by an
external observer termed intruder with potentially malicious
intentions [2]. It is usually assumed that the intruder knows
the system’s structure but has only partial observation over
its behavior [3]. The system is considered to be opaque if the
intruder is not able to unambiguously determine the system
secrets from its observations.
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In recent years, opacity has been extensively studied in
the discrete event system (DES) literature, and different
notions of opacity have been proposed, including current-
state opacity [4], language-based opacity [2], initial-state
opacity [5], K−step, and infinite-step opacity [6]. Interested
readers may refer to [3] for a comprehensive review on
various notions of opacity.
It is worthy pointing out that the intruder model considered
in these methods is a passive observer who is only able to
partially observe the system behavior. However, many real-
world systems are interacting with malicious and hostile
environments, whose capability is beyond a passive obser-
vation. A system’s malicious environment can act as an
active intruder, who strategically injects a certain input to the
system and observers the system’s response to infer its secret.
For instance, web browsers and client-side web applications
are typical cases of such systems since they interact with
remote and possibly untrusted clients that raise a serious
concern about the privacy of local users’ data [7].
In this paper, we aim at extending the opacity notion in the
presence of an active intruder. In particular, who is capable of
manipulating the system’s input and partially observing the
system output. This setup naturally models reactive systems
[8], such as interactive programs [9] and web services [7],
where input provided by the environment (possibly intruder)
and the output of the system is exchanged continuously
throughout the indefinite execution of the system.
Toward this aim, we introduce reactive current-state opac-
ity (RCSO) characterizing the active intruder’s ability in
manipulating the system’s input to certainly determine if
the system’s current-state is a secret state. We furthermore
extend this notion to reactive language-based opacity and re-
active initial-state opacity. Reactive language-based opacity
requires the secret behavior of the system to be indistinguish-
able from a non-secret one. Reactive initial-state opacity
notions ensure the active intruder cannot unambiguously
determine if the system starts from a secret initial-state.
Upon these opacity notions, we present their relationship,
the feasibility of each notion, and a procedure to transform
one to the other. It turns out that all the proposed reactive
opacity notions are equivalent to RCSO. We therefore focus
on RCSO, and we study its verification problem.
Formal verification of current-state opacity is addressed
in [10] and is further extended to other notions of opacity
in [4], [5]. In analogs to verification of opacity with the
passive intruder, here we propose to construct an observer
automata. Given the intruder choice of input and the system
response (the observable output event), the observer states
capture the estimated current-state of the system. Hence, t
RCSO verification problem can be reduced to finding the
observer states that include a singleton of the secret states.
The contribution of this paper can be summarized as
follows. (i) Consider a new intruder model who has the
capability of injecting input into the system; (ii) associated
with the new intruder model, we introduce a new class
of opacity definitions including the reactive current-state,
reactive initial-state, and reactive language-based opacity
notions and studies the relationship among them; (iii) provide
necessary and sufficient conditions for verification of reactive
current-state opacity.
II. RELATED NOTATIONS
In this section, we review some preliminary notations that
will be used throughout the paper. For a given finite set
(alphabet) of events Σ, a finite word w = σ1σ2 . . . σn, n ≥ 1,
is a finite sequence of elements in Σ, for all σi ∈ Σ, and
1 ≤ i ≤ n. We denote the length of w by ∣w∣. Let w, and u
be finite words, w ⋅ u is their concatenations. The notation
2
Σ refers to the power set of Σ, that is, the set of all subsets
of Σ. A set difference is Σ−A = {x ∣ x ∈ Σ, x /∈ A}. The free
monoid Σ∗ generated by Σ is the set of all finite sequences
σ1σ2 . . . σn, including the empty sequence denoted by ǫ. A
subset of Σ∗ is called a language over Σ. The prefix-closure
of a language L ⊆ Σ∗, denoted as L, is the set of all prefixes
of words in L, i.e., L = {s ∈ Σ∗∣(∃t ∈ Σ∗)[st ∈ L]}. L is said
to be prefix-closed if L = L. Let’s consider alphabet sets X ,
Y , and their set product ΣXY = X × Y . A relation R over
sets X and Y is a subset of the Cartesian product X ×Y . A
regular (or rational) relation over the alphabets X and Y is
formed from a finite combination of the following rules: 1:
(x, y) ∈ (X ∪{ǫ})×(Y ∪{ǫ}), 2: ∅ is a regular relation, and
3: If R1, R2 are regular relations, then so are R1 ⋅R2, R1∩R2,
and R∗1 . Projection function to sets X and Y are respectively
denoted as PX = Σ
∗
XY → X
∗, PY = Σ
∗
XY → Y
∗, and
inductively are defined by PX((ǫ, ǫ)) = ǫ, and ∀w ∈ Σ
∗
XY ,
and (x, y) ∈ Σ∗XY , we have PX(w ⋅(x, y)) = PX(w) ⋅x, and
PY (w ⋅ (x, y)) = PY (w) ⋅ y.
A non-deterministic finite state automata (NFA) A =
(Q,∆,Q0, Ta) is a 4-tuple composed of finite state Q,
a finite set of event ∆, a partial state transition function
Ta ∶ Q × ∆ → 2
Q, and the set of initial states Q0. The
transition function Ta can be extended to word in a standard
recursive manner. The behavior of NFA A is captured by
L(A) = {s ∈ ∆∗ ∣ ∃q0 ∈ Q0 s.t. Ta(q0, s) ≠ ∅}, and for a
given initial state q0 ∈ Q0 is L(A, q0) = {s ∈ ∆
∗ ∣ Ta(q0, s) ≠
∅}. A is called deterministic finite automata (DFA) if for any
q ∈ Q and δ ∈∆ that T (q, δ) is defined, ∣Ta(q, δ)∣ = 1.
III. OPEN DISCRETE EVENT SYSTEM
The finite-state transducers capture transformation of data
that is realized by processing inputs and producing outputs
using finite memory [11]. We use non-deterministic finite-
state transducer (NFT) to characterize the interaction be-
tween the system and its environment. Throughout this paper,
we refer to NFT as an open DES to emphasize a system
model which receives input from an active intruder.
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Fig. 1. An example of open DES G. Note that ǫ ∈ λ(q, x) for all q ∈ Q,
and x ∈Xǫ. We removed the ǫ input transitions for clarity of the figures.
Definition 1 (Non-deterministic Finite-State Transducer):
The nondeterministic finite-state transducer is defined by
G = (Q,X,∆,Q0, T, λ), where Q is the finite set of states,
X is finite set of external events, ∆ =∆o∪∆uo, is the finite
set of output events which is partitioned to two disjoint sets
of observable output events ∆o and unobservable output
events ∆uo. Q0 is the set of initial states. The state transition
function is T ∶ Q ×Xǫ → 2
Q, and λ ∶ Q ×Xǫ → 2
∆ǫ is the
output function, where Xǫ =X ∪ {ǫ} and ∆ǫ =∆ ∪ {ǫ}.
The notation T (q, x)! means that T (q, x) is defined for
x ∈ X and state q ∈ Q. The extension of T to words
is denoted as T ∗ ∶ Q × X∗ → 2Q and can be defined
recursively for all q ∈ Q as T ∗(q,w) = q if w = ǫ, and
T ∗(q,w) = ⋃q′∈T (q,x) T
∗(q′, v) if w = x ⋅ v, x ∈ X, and
v ∈ X∗ [12]. Here, T (q, ǫ) = q for each q ∈ Q, indicates
that if the input is the empty word, we will remain at the
current state. The extension of output function to words
also is denoted as λ∗ ∶ Q × X∗ → 2∆
∗
, and it can be
defined as follows. Given any w ∈ X∗, and s ∈ ∆∗, we
have s ∈ λ∗(q,w) for some q ∈ Q, if and only if, either
w = s = ǫ, or w = x ⋅ w′, s = δ ⋅ s′ for some x ∈ X , and
δ ∈ ∆, and there exists a state q′ ∈ Q such that q′ ∈ T (q, x),
δ ∈ λ(q, x), and s′ ∈ λ∗(q′,w′). The recognized language
of G is L(G,Q0) = {w ∈ X
∗ ∣ ∃q0 ∈ Q0 s.t T (q0,w)!}.
Throughout the paper, we use T as a shorthand for T ∗, λ
for λ∗, and L(G) for L(G,Q0).
Given an input word w ∈ L(G), the output word will
not be uniquely determined, due to the non-determinism of
the transition and output functions. For each q0 ∈ Q and
w ∈ L(G,q0), a set O(w, q0) of possible output words is
defined inductively as follows:
● O(ǫ, q0) = {ǫ},
● ∀w ∈ L(G,q0), ∀x ∈X , such that w ⋅ x ∈ L(G,q0):
O(w ⋅ x, q0) = {s ⋅ δ ∈ ∆
∗ ∣ s ∈ O(w, q0) and δ ∈
⋃q∈T (q0,w) λ(q, x)}.
We denote O(w) = ⋃q0∈Q0 O(w, q0). The set of all pos-
sible output words in G is denoted by O(L(G)), that
is, O(L(G)) = ⋃q0∈Q0,w∈L(G,q0)O(w, q0) ⊆ ∆
∗. We call
O(L(G)) the output language of G.
Example 1: Consider the open DES shown in Figure 1,
where ∆ = {δ1, δ2, a, b}, X = {x1, x2}, and the initial state
is Q0 = {0}. An edge in the model is in the form of x/Y ,
where x ∈ Xǫ, represents the input event, and and Y ⊆ ∆ǫ
denotes the set of possible output events. Multiple labels over
an edge indicates multiple enabled transitions. For instance,
for x1x1 ∈ L(G), we have O(x1x1) = {δ1δ2, δ2δ2}, that is,
two output words, δ1δ2, and δ2δ2 are possible. ◻
If there are marked states, we define open DES as
G = (Q,X,∆,Q0, T, λ,F ), where F ⊆ Q are the marked
states. The input-output language of G, denoted as Lio(G),
is defined by Lio(G) = {(w,s) ∈ (X × ∆)
∗ ∣ ∃q0 ∈
Q0, s.t. T (q0,w)!, and s ∈ λ(q0,w)}, and its input-output
marked language is given by Lio,m(G) = {(w,s) ∈ (X ×
∆)∗ ∣ ∃q0 ∈ Q0, s.t. T (q0,w) ∩ F ≠ ∅, and s ∈ λ(q0,w)}.
The input-output languages of G is a regular relation over the
set (X∪{ǫ})×(∆∪{ǫ}) that can be conveniently recognized
by an non-deterministic finite-state transducer [13].
The accessible part of an NFT G = (Q,X,∆,Q0, T, λ,F )
is denoted by Ac(G) and is obtained by removing the
states that cannot be reached from any initial state q0 ∈
Q0 in finite number of steps. The coaccessible part of G,
denoted by CoAc(G) is an NFT obtained by deleting the
states that cannot reach to the marked states F . The trim
operation, denoted by Trim, transforms G to another NFT
as a part of G that is both accessible and coaccessible,
formally Trim(G) = Ac(CoAc(G)) = CoAc(Ac(G)) [14].
Similarly, for an NFA A, we can define Trim(A), Ac(A),
and CoAc(A).
IV. OPACITY OF DISCRETE-EVENT SYSTEMS
Opacity is characterized by the system’s secret and the
intruder’s observation mapping over the system’s executions.
The system is opaque, if for any execution run that contains
secret, there exists another non-secret run which is observ-
ably equivalent. In the formalism of opacity, the intruder
is considered as an observer who has full knowledge of
the system structure but has a partial observability over
it. Typically, the intruder’s partial observability is modeled
by a natural projection function. The natural projection is
P ∶ ∆∗ → ∆∗o , and for any s ∈ ∆
∗, and δ ∈ ∆, it is defined
recursively by P (ǫ) = ǫ, and P (s ⋅ δ) = P (s) ⋅ δ if δ ∈ ∆o
and otherwise P (s ⋅ δ) = P (s).
The system secret information or behavior can be repre-
sented in different ways, such as secret states and languages.
In the conventional opacity of DESs with passive intruder,
various opacity notions for different representation of secret
have been introduced including but not limited to current-
state, language-based, and initial-state opacity [3].
A. Current-State Opacity
Here, we first discuss the current-state opacity (CSO)
definition when the intruder is just a passive observer; and
later, we will show how an active intruder can force a current-
state opaque system to expose its secret states.
Definition 2 (Current-State Opacity): Given a non-
deterministic finite-state automata A = (Q,∆,Q0, Ta), and
a passive intruder with projection function P , a set of
secret state Qs ⊂ Q, the system A is current-state opaque
if ∀q0 ∈ Q0 and ∀s ∈ L(A, q0) such that Ta(q0, s) ⊆ Qs,
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Fig. 2. Current-state estimator of the passive intruder for the open DES
in Figure 1.
there exists q′0 ∈ Q0 and ∃s
′ ∈ L(A, q′0), such that
Ta(q
′
0, s
′) ⊆ {Q −Qs} and P (s) = P (s
′).
Intuitively, when the intruder can only observe the system
outputs with projection P , A is current-state opaque if for
every word s ∈ L(A) leading to a secret state in Qs, there
exists at least another word s′ ∈ L(A) that leads to non-
secret states {Q −Qs} whose projection is the same. Thus,
the intruder can never determine that the system’s current
state is in Qs. One can check whether the system A with
a passive intruder is current-state opaque by constructing a
current-state estimator (observer) and by verifying that no
(nonempty) current-state estimate lies entirely within the set
of secret states Qs [15].
Example 2: Consider the open DES G depicted in Figure
1 with ∆o = {δ1, δ2, a}, ∆uo = {b}, and Qs = {3}. We
first assume the intruder is passive and can only observe the
observable outputs through projection function P . In order
to evaluate CSO on G, we can associate a NFA A with the
open DES G. Let’s consider the NFA AG = (Q,∆,Q0, T
′
a),
where the transition function T ′a, for any q, q
′ ∈ Q, and δ ∈
∆, is defined as q′ ∈ T ′a(q, δ), if there exists x ∈ X such
that q′ ∈ T (q, x) and δ ∈ λ(q, x); otherwise T ′a(q, δ) is not
defined. We can construct an observer automata to check if
AG is current-state opaque with respect to P , and Qs. The
observer is shown in Figure 2. The observer shows the secret
state {3} never lies entirely on single state of the observer,
and hence, A is current-state opaque with respect to Qs and
P . However, if the intruder is capable of providing a certain
input word to the system and observe the system’s output
through P , she can infer when the system is in the secret
state. Specifically, consider the input word w = x1x
∗
2x1 that
drives the system to land on one of the states {2,3}, and here,
if the active intruder chooses x2, i.e., w ⋅x2 and observes a,
she can infer the current-state of the system is certainly at the
secret state {3}. However, if a is an unobservable event, the
active intruder with the same input word x1x
∗
2x1x2, cannot
determine whether the system is at {3} or {2}. ◻
As Example 2 illustrates, an active intruder can force the
open DES G to expose his secret-state. We, therefore, need
a new current-state opacity notion that captures this active
intruder ability. In particular, we consider an active intruder
who has full knowledge of the open DES model; and is
capable of injecting input to the system and (partially)
observing the system output.
To evaluate an open DES current-state opacity, we can
construct a current-state estimator that tracks the active in-
truder estimated states. Given an input word accepted by the
system w ∈ L(G), and an observed word α ∈ P (O(L(G))),
the current-state estimator is defined by:
Q˜G(w,α) = {q ∈ Q ∣∃q0 ∈ Q,q ∈ T (q0,w), and
∃s ∈ O(w, q0), s.t. P (s) = α}.
The current-state estimator Q˜G(w,α) essentially charac-
terizes a set of states which the open DES lands on as
a result of the input word w, and meanwhile it produces
the observable sequences α. We also define the current-state
estimator for a given initial state q0 ∈ Q0, as Q˜
G
q0
(w,α) =
{q ∈ Q ∣ q ∈ T (q0,w), and ∃s ∈ O(w, q0), s.t. P (s) = α}.
We use Q˜(w,α) instead of Q˜G(w,α), and Q˜q0(w,α) for
Q˜Gq0(w,α), when it is clear from the context. Upon this
current-state estimator, we define the reactive current-state
opacity in the following.
Definition 3 (Reactive Current-State Opacity): Given an
open DES G = (Q,X,∆,Q0, T, λ), projection function P ,
and the set of secret states Qs ⊂ Q, the system is reactive
current-state opaque (RCS-opaque) if for any w ∈ L(G)
there exists q0 ∈ Q0 such that:
● T (q0,w) ∩ {Q −Qs} ≠ ∅,
● ∀t ∈ P (O(w, q0)), we have Q˜q0(w, t) ∩ {Q−Qs} ≠ ∅.
Intuitively, the open DES G is RCS-opaque, if with any
input word w that is recognized by G, i.e., w ∈ L(G), i)
there exists an initial state q0 ∈ Q0 such that the system with
w does not land entirely at the secret states, i.e., T (q0,w)∩
{Q − Qs} ≠ ∅; and ii) for any possible observable output
word associated with the input, t ∈ P (O(w, q0)), we have
Q˜q0(w, t) ∩ {Q −Qs} ≠ ∅, that is, the intruder cannot use
the observed output events to resolve the non-determinism
of the transition function T (q0,w) to infer the current secret
state of the system.
Remark 1: In the definition of RCSO, the input word w,
is not required to be restricted to the recognized words by
the open DES G, w ∈ L(G), and it can be any w ∈ X∗.
However, clearly G does not accept any w ∈ {X∗ −L(G)},
and hence, it does not reveal any secret.
Example 3: Consider the system G in Figure 1, with
secret state set Qs = {2}. In this case, G is not RCSO
since the intruder with input word w = x2, and regardless of
the observed output events, can ensure the system current-
state is {2}. However, if Qs = {3}, the system with any
w ∈ L(G), does not proceed solely to Qs, and therefore,
the intruder potentially can use the observed output events
to infer the secret state from the system’s possible current-
states. For instance, with x1x1x2, the possible current-states
of the system are {2,3}, and if the observed output word
is t ⋅ a, where t is any t ∈ O(x1x1), the intruder is able to
certainly infer the current-state of G is the secret state {3},
that indicates G is not RCS-opaque. ◻
Remark 2: The proposed RCSO notion with an active
intruder is a generalization of CSO notion with the passive
intruder. As it is illustrated in Example 2, if we consider open
DES with a passive intruder who has a partial observation
on the system’s output, the proposed RCSO can capture the
CSO notion.
B. Other Opacity Notions
Other notions of opacity can be extended to the open DESs
with an active intruder. In this paper, we introduce reactive
language-based and reactive initial-state opacity notions.
The reactive language-based opacity (RLBO) characterizes
a secret run of the system that should be protected against
an active intruder.
Definition 4 (Reactive Language-Based Opacity): Given
an open DES G = (Q,X,∆,Q0, T, λ), projection function
P , and secret output language Os ⊂ O(L(G)), and non-
secret output language Ons ⊆ O(L(G)), G is reactive
language-based opaque, if for all q0 ∈ Q0, and any
w ∈ L(G,q0) that O(w, q0) ∩Os ≠ ∅, there exists q
′
0 ∈ Q0
such that:
● O(w, q′0) ∩Ons ≠ ∅,
● ∀t ∈ (O(w, q0)∩Os),∃t
′ ∈ (O(w, q′0)∩Ons) such that
P (t) = P (t′).
Intuitively, G is reactive language-based opaque with
respect to the secret output language Os, non-secret output
language Ons, and the projection function P , if for any
input word w ∈ L(G,q0) that generates secret output word,
O(w, q0)∩Os ≠ ∅, there exists an initial state q
′
0 ∈ Q0, such
that the same input word from the intruder can be associated
with a non-secret output word, O(w, q′0) ∩ Ons ≠ ∅, and
additionally, for any secret output word t ∈ O(w, q0) ∩ Os
there exists a non-secret output word t′ ∈ (O(w, q′0)∩Ons),
such that they have the same observation P (t) = P (t′).
Initial-state opacity is another notion of opacity defined
over the system secret initial states. For open DESs, reactive
initial-state opacity (RISO) can be defined as follows.
Definition 5: (Reactive Initial State Opacity) Given an
open DES G = (Q,X,∆,Q0, T, λ), projection function P ,
and secret initial state set Q0s ⊂ Q0, and non-secret initial
state set Q0ns ⊆ Q0, G is reactive initial-state opaque, if
∀q0 ∈ Q
0
s and any input words w ∈ L(G) with any t ∈
O(w, q0), there exists a non-secret initial-state q
′
0 ∈ Q
0
ns and
t′ ∈ O(w, q′0) such that P (t) = P (t
′).
An open DES G is reactive initial-state opaque with respect
to the secret initial-state set Q0s, non-secret initial-state set
Q0ns, and the projection function P , if for any secret initial-
state q0 ∈ Q
0
s, and any input word w ∈ L(G), that generates
an output word t, i.e., t ∈ O(w, q0), there exists a non-secret
initial state q′0 ∈ Q
0
ns, and an output word t
′ ∈ O(w, q′0),
associated with w and q′0, such that, t and t
′ have the same
observation, i.e., P (t) = P (t′).
Similar to the opacity notions with a passive intruder [16],
there is a relationship between the proposed reactive opacity
notions. We call a problem of checking if a given open DES
satisfies the RCSO conditions, a RCSO problem. Similarly,
in the sequel, we use the terms RLBO and RISO problems.
We mainly follow the idea proposed in [16] to transform the
reactive opacity problems to each other.
Proposition 1: A RLBO problem can be converted to an
equivalent RCSO problem.
Proof: Construct an NFT Gs =
(Ss,X,∆, Ts, Ss0, λs, Fs) such that Lio,m(Gs) =
{(w,s) ∈ (X × ∆)∗ ∣ w ∈ L(G) and s ∈ Os}, and an
NFT Gns = (Sns,X,∆, Tns, Sns0, λns, Fns) that accepts
Lio,m(Gns) = {(w,s) ∈ (X×∆)
∗ ∣ w ∈ L(G) and s ∈ Ons}.
Then consider Gs and Gns as single NFT by constructing
Gc = (Ss∪Sns,X,∆, Ts∪Tns, Ss0∪Sns0, λs∪λns, Fs∪Fns),
and define the secret and non-secret state sets respectively
as Qs = Fs and Qns = Fns. Therefore, for any q0 ∈ Q0,
w ∈ L(G,q0) and t ∈ O(w, q0) ⊆ Os, there exist
s0 ∈ (Ss0 ∪ Sns0) and ρ ∈ Lio,m(Gc, s0) with PX(ρ) = w
and P∆o(ρ) = t, such that Q˜
Gc
s0
(w, t) ⊆ Qs; and if
∃q′0 ∈ Q0 and t ∈ O(w, q
′
0) ⊆ Ons, indicating G is reactive
language-based opaque, we have s′0 ∈ (Ss0 ∪ Sns0) and
ρ′ ∈ Lio,m(Gc, s
′
0) with PX(ρ
′) = w and P∆o(ρ
′) = t′, such
that Q˜Gc
s′
0
(w, t′) ⊆ Qns, which implies Gc is RCS-opaque.
The other direction of this transformation is also possible.
A RCSO problem can be converted to an equivalent RLBO
problem.
Proposition 2: A RCSO problem can be converted to an
equivalent RLBO problem.
Proof: Given an RCSO problem with G =
(Q,X,∆,Q0, T, λ), secret states Qs ⊂ Q, and non-secret
states set Qns ⊆ Q. Construct an NFT with Qs as the marked
states, defined as Gs = Trim(Q,X,∆, T,Q0, λ,Qs), and
another NFT with Qns as the marked states, given by
Gns = Trim(Q,X,∆, T,Q0, λ,Qns). Then define the se-
cret and non-secret output language respectively by Os =
P∆(Lio,m(Gs)) and Ons = P∆(Lio,m(Gns)).
The RISO is related to the RLBO. Proposition 3 and 4
establish this relationship.
Proposition 3: RISO problem can be converted to an
equivalent RLBO problem.
Proof: Given open RISO problem with G =
(Q,X,∆, T,Q0, λ), secret initial-state set Q
0
s ⊂ Q0, and
non-secret initial state set Q0ns ⊆ Q0, construct an NFT
by trimming G to only the secret initial-state set Q0s,
given as Gs = Trim(Q,X,∆, T,Q
0
s, λ), and similarly con-
struct another NFT with Q0ns as initial-state set, Gns =
Trim(Q,X,∆, T,Q0ns, λ). Then combine Gs and Gns as
Gl = Trim(Q,X,∆, T,Q
0
s ∪ Q
0
ns, λ), and define the se-
cret and non-secret output languages respectively by Os =
O(L(G,Q0s)), and Ons = O(L(G,Q
0
ns)).
The other direction of this transformation does not always
hold. A RLBO problem can be transformed to an equivalent
RISO only if Os and Ons are prefix-closed.
Proposition 4: Given a RLBO problem with prefix-closed
Os and Ons, there exists an equivalent RISO problem.
Proof: Given an RLBO problem with the open DES
G = (Q,X,∆, T,Q0, λ), and prefix-closed secret output
language Os ⊂ O(L(G)), and prefix-closed non-secret out-
put language Ons ⊆ O(L(G)). Construct an NFT Gs =
(Ss,X,∆, Ts, Ss0, λs) such that Lio(Gs) = {ρ ∈ (X ×
∆)∗ ∣ PX(ρ) ∈ L(G) and P∆(ρ) ∈ Os}, and an NFT
Gns = (Sns,X,∆, Tns, Sns0, λns) that accepts Lio(Gns) =
{ρ ∈ (X × ∆)∗ ∣ PX(ρ) ∈ L(G) and P∆(ρ) ∈ Ons}.
Then consider Gs and Gns as single NFT by constructing
Gc = (Ss ∪ Sns,X,∆, Ts ∪ Tns, Ss0 ∪ Sns0, λs ∪ λns), and
RLBO RCSORISO
Proposition 1
Proposition 2Proposition 4
Proposition 3
Fig. 3. The equivalence relation in the reactive opacity notions.
define the secret and non-secret initial-state sets respectively
as Q0s = Ss0 and Q
0
ns = Sns0.
Remark 3: It is shown that the proposed RCSO and
RLBO are equivalent properties for G. The RISO can be
transformed to a RLBO property, however, the reverse of this
transformation (RLBO to RISO), only holds for prefix-closed
secret and non-secret languages. Therefore, if the prefix-
closed conditions hold, RISO is also an equivalent property
to RCSO. Figure 3 illustrates this relation.
V. RCSO VERIFICATION
In this section, we present the verification of RCSO
notion for open DESs. Similar to current-state opacity with a
passive intruder [4], we can construct an observer automata
to verify if an open DES is RCS-opaque. In conventional
opacity with a passive intruder, the observer is constructed
to track the system states based on the observable events
[15]. In the reactive opacity formalism, however, the intruder
knows the injected input word, and hence the system (non-
deterministic) transitions. As it is illustrated in Example
3, the active intruder can utilize the system observable
responses to resolve the ambiguity of his estimation caused
by the system’s non-deterministic transition. The observer for
RCSO verification ,therefore, should include both possible
input and observable output behavior of the system to track
the estimated states. Furthermore, an open DES may only
have a single and perhaps unique unobservable output event
for a given input that can reveal a secret state. Therefore,
in contrary to the conventional opacity with passive intruder,
an active intruder can even use an unobservable response to
infer the open DES states. This ability should be encoded in
the active intruder observer.
Definition 6 (Observer for RCSO): Given an open DES
G = (Q,X,∆,Q0, T, λ), a projection function P with
respect to the observable output events ∆o, the observer
automata is a deterministic finite-state automata Go =
Ac(Qˆ,X,∆o, Qˆ0, To) with state set Qˆ = 2
Q, the initial state
set is Qˆ0 = Q0 ∪ {q ∈ Q ∣ ∃q0 ∈ Q0, s.t q ∈ T (q0, ǫ)}.
Let’s denote ∆o,ǫ = ∆o ∪ {ǫ}, the transition function is
To ∶ Qˆ × Xǫ ×∆o,ǫ → Qˆ, that for any qˆ ∈ Qˆ, x ∈ Xǫ, and
an observable event δ ∈ ∆o is given by To(qˆ, (x, δ)) = {qˆ
′ ∈
Qˆ ∣ ∃q ∈ qˆ s.t qˆ′ ⊆ T (q, x) and δ ∈ λ(q, x)}, and for an
unobservable event, it is defined by To(qˆ, (x, ǫ)) = {qˆ
′ ∈ Qˆ ∣
∃q ∈ qˆ s.t qˆ′ ⊆ T (q, x) and ∃δuo ∈ (∆uo ∪ {ǫ}) s.t. δuo ∈
λ(q, x)}.
The initial estimated states Qˆ0 is constructed based on the
combination of the possible initial states, Q0, and any initial
transitions with no input to the open DES, i.e., T (q0, ǫ). Note
that, based on the definition of open DES in Definition 1,
for any q0 ∈ Q0, we have ǫ ∈ λ(q0, ǫ), and therefore, Qˆ0 is
{0} {1,3} {2,3}
{2} {3}
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Fig. 4. Observer automata for the open DES in Example 1. For clarity of
the figure we remove all the transitions for the empty input, x = ǫ.
solely defined based on Q0 and T (q0, ǫ). In the constructed
observer, To(qˆ, (x, ǫ)) captures the active intruder ability
to infer the system transition when he injects input x and
receives no observable output.
Given the constructed observer Go, one can verify if G
is RCS-opaque by checking if there exists any state qˆ ∈ Qˆ
which is reachable from Qˆ0 and only contains the system
secret states Qs, i.e., qˆ ⊆ Qs. The RCSO verification based
on the proposed observer construction is formally given in
the following theorem.
Theorem 1: Given an open DES G = (Q,X,∆,Q0, T, λ),
the projection function P , the secret state set Qs ⊂ Q,
the associated observer Go = Ac(Qˆ,X,∆o, Qˆ0, To) can be
constructed by following Definition 6. Then G is RCS-
opaque if and only if for all qˆ ∈ Qˆ either qˆ = ∅ or qˆ /⊆ Qs
holds.
Proof: Necessary: here we show if G is RCS-opaque,
then there is no state qˆ ∈ Qˆ in the constructed observer
(following Definition 6) that qˆ /⊆ Qs. Let’s denote Qo ⊆ Qˆ as
the reachable states in Go. To prove this part, we only need to
show that for any input word and the observed output word,
the states in the observerGo are the estimated current-state of
the system. Consider any ρ ∈ (X×∆)∗, such that To(Q0, ρ)!,
then since ρ ∈ PX∆o(Lio(G)), there should exists w ∈ L(G),
and α ∈ P (O(w)) such that PX(ρ) = w, P∆o(ρ) = α, and
Q˜(w,α) ≠ ∅. In addition, following Definition 6, Q˜(w,α)
and To(Q0, ρ) provides the same estimated states, meaning,
for any q ∈ Q˜(w,α), we have qˆ = To(Q0, ρ) with q ∈ qˆ.
Therefore, if G is RCS-opaque, then Q˜(w,α) /⊆ Qs which
implies qˆ /⊆ Qs.
Sufficiency: here we show if for all qˆ ∈ Qo, we have
qˆ /⊆ Qs then G should be RCS-opaque. We prove this
part by contradiction. Let’s assume G is not RCS-opaque
that implies there should exists a w ∈ L(G) such that
Q˜(w,α) ⊆ Qs for some α ∈ P (O(w)). Therefore, similar
to the necessary part, we know Q˜(w,α) and To(Q0, ρ) with
PX(ρ) = w and P∆o(ρ) = α, provide the same estimated
states. This implies, we have the observer state qˆ = To(Q0, ρ)
that qˆ ⊆ Qs which contradicts the first assumption.
The following example illustrates the observer construc-
tion described above.
Example 4: Consider the open DES G in Figure 1 with
Qs = {3}, ∆o = {δ1, δ2, a}, and ∆uo = {b}. The constructed
observer for G is shown in Figure 4. An edge label is in
the form of x, δ, where x ∈ X , and δ ∈ ∆o,ǫ. As it is shown
in the Figure 4, the secret state {3} is reachable from the
initial state in the constructed observer, indicating that G is
not RCS-opaque. ◻
VI. CONCLUSION
In the conventional opacity formalism, the intruder is
considered as a passive observer. In this paper, we studied
opacity in the presence of an active intruder which beyond
a passive observation, is capable of manipulating the system
behavior. In this setup, the active intruder can inject a
certain input to the system and combine it with the observed
system response to infer the secrets. We therefore introduced
reactive opacity notions which characterize a property that
regardless of how the intruder selects the input word, the
system’s secret property remains indistinguishable from the
non-secrets. We furthermore showed that all the proposed
reactive opacity notions can be transformed into the RCSO.
Given a RCSO notion and a system modeled as NFT, we
proposed an automata-based method to verify if the system
respects RCSO requirements. In the future works, we plan
to study probabilistic reactive opacity for stochastic DESs.
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